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Optimal Liquidation of Venture Capital Stakes 
 
 
 
Robert Dubil
++
 
San Jose State University
*
 
 
 
 
We model the optimal liquidation behavior of a venture capital or non-diversified asset 
management firm faced with a sale of concentrated security holdings. As the firm‟s stake 
is large, its sales can lead to permanent and temporary price depressions. At the optimum, 
the institution chooses the liquidation interval to balance the exposure to the market 
return variance against the impact of its own sales on the realized return. We obtain 
closed-form solutions for power impact functions uncorrelated with returns.  We also 
consider market impact correlated with the return process, i.e. a case where liquidity 
evaporates during severe price dislocations. 
 
 By the very nature of the business, venture capitalists find themselves holding 
significant stakes in the companies they own. Cashing out of their positions carries 
significant liquidity costs and risks. Their sales are closely watched and are perceived to 
have informational content. Large liquidations are subject to price pressures and time 
delays. This paper offers a theoretical model of the optimal disposition strategy for a 
venture capital (VC) firm. 
 Market microstructure research studies the role of trading mechanisms on the 
price-setting process. Most papers, the best known being Kyle (1985) and Glosten and 
Harris (1988), investigate the size of the bid-ask spread in the listed stock markets. Their 
goal is largely descriptive. We build on the behaviorally prescriptive work of Bertsimas 
and Lo (1998), and Almgren and Chriss (2000). They consider an optimization problem 
of an agent who liquidates a large block of securities. As the agent trades, he affects the 
market price. His impact on the market price can be temporary (disappears when the 
market absorbs the quantity he supplies) and permanent (persists due to its informational 
content). The models solve for the optimal sales trajectory (a sequence of sales quantities) 
over the total liquidation time. They assume that the final liquidation horizon is 
exogenously given, and so their results are particularly useful for proprietary traders 
where the holding time is pre-determined by a policy limit or some relative-value strategy  
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horizon. In this paper, we take the perspective of an agent that routinely, but infrequently, 
trades illiquid securities. This could include a venture capitalist, a private equity firm, or 
a high-yield fund. For such an agent, the best total time in which to liquidate any given 
security position, is not exogenously given, but is itself a solution to an optimization 
problem. The agent solves for the optimal length of time over which he engages in a 
sequence or a continuum of equal-size trades. He trades off between the impact of his 
trades on the realized sale value and the risk of holding the assets for an extended period 
of time. The focus is on the concept of endogenous liquidity, as defined by Bangia et al. 
(1999). An agent who decides to sell a large position in the market, where „large‟ is 
defied as exceeding the standard quote depth, will adversely affect the price at which he 
transacts if he sells too quickly. This sale discount will be the price he will pay for 
avoiding the market risk of the position. At the optimal time to liquidate, the change in 
his marginal utility will be zero. 
 The only simplifying assumption we make is that of constant sales speed which 
may lead in non-trivial cases to sub-optimality in the stochastic control sense. Almgren 
and Chriss (2000) show that the deviation is relatively small for the type of “utility” 
function we choose. The restriction is motivated by practical considerations. First, it 
introduces a simple one-dimensional liquidity metric with which to assess the combined 
market and liquidity risk of different equity stakes a venture capital firm may hold. This 
avoids having to account for several risk factors like the stock return variances, the sizes 
of the positions relative to the quote depths, the impact parameters, etc. Second, for 
concentrated stakes, it is hard to segregate permanent and temporary impacts. A VC firm 
with positions in several assets is likely to ignore the extra risk of a linear strategy 
relative to its optimal non-linear alternative for a given final time, and instead will focus 
on the total time.  
 Following the 1996 mandate from the Federal Reserve, money center banks with 
trading portfolios started disclosing market risk statistics in their annual statements and 
setting aside capital against those risks based on internal Value-at-Risk (VaR) models. 
For definitions, see Bank of International Settlements (1996). Increasingly, private equity 
and asset management firms have started to adopt similar models to manage the non-
diversifiable (market price and liquidity) risks of their portfolios. Jarrow and 
Subramanian (1997), and Bangia et al. (1999) extend the market VaR model to 
exogenous liquidity risk factors, i.e. those beyond the firm‟s control (e.g. quote size, bid-
ask spread). Dubil (2001) extends it further to endogenous liquidity and provides a 
method of aggregating VaR across the firm‟s sub-portfolios, each subject to a different 
liquidation horizon. This paper contributes indirectly to this line of research in that it 
offers a method of parameterizing the necessary inputs for the enhanced VaR model. At 
the same time, we make a practical use of the VaR concept: as a simple “utility” function 
which relates the risk (profit variance) to the return (proceeds) of the liquidation program. 
The agent reveals his risk preferences by choosing a confidence interval parameter,  , 
which determines the worst-loss tail probability he is willing to accept. The choice of a 
“utility” function affects the behavior of the optimizing agent, but our results do not 
depend on that particular choice. We could easily obtain closed-form solutions for 
alternative formulations involving a general HARA class as defined by Huang and 
Litzenberger (1988).  
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 The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the research examining the 
optimal liquidation behavior of an agent selling a large block to the market. The control 
parameter is always the sales trajectory over a given a fixed sales horizon, but the studies 
differ in the assumptions they make about the underlying price processes and objective 
functions. Then, we develop, from first principles, a model of the optimal liquidation 
time under the assumption of a constant speed trajectory. The model is recast from units 
and prices into the terms of dollar exposures and returns. The latter offers the preferred 
log-normality of prices and is applicable to the general case of liquidating a large block 
of shares or a private equity stake prior to an IPO. We consider two formulations of the 
impact functions: general power uncorrelated with the price and linear correlated with the 
price process. We obtain closed-form solutions for the first group and numerical ones for 
the second which is in a sense more general, as it allows for the market impacts to change 
(i.e. increase) during large market dislocations. We provide intuitions for the example 
solutions and include the discussion of the alternatives for the optimization functions. 
 
I. Optimal Liquidation Trajectories in Finance Literature 
 As Chan and Lakonishok (1995) showed, a typical large investor‟s trade in the 
stock market is broken down into smaller packages and executed over a period of four 
days or more. Presumably, such protracted liquidation is designed to minimize the 
adverse impact on the overall transaction price, but exposes the trader to market risk. 
Two studies – Bertsimas and Lo (1998), and Almgren and Chriss (2000) – examine the 
best execution strategies for a stock trader under the constraint that he decides in advance 
on the final close-out date. The trader‟s objective is to acquire (liquidate) a fixed number 
of shares, X , in a fixed time period, T . As market conditions change he speeds up or 
slows down his purchases (sales), but his holdings are always equal to the targeted 
amount (zero) on the final date.  
 Bertsimas and Lo (1998) consider an expected trading cost minimization for a 
program designed to acquire a fixed number of shares, X , by the final time, T . While 
the program is in effect, new information arrives in the market in the form of random 
shocks to the trading price. The price is also affected by each trade executed in the 
program. The authors write the basic Bellman equation for this dynamic programming 
optimization and employ the optimal control machinery to solve recursively for the best 
trading trajectory. A trajectory is defined as a sequence of the amounts purchased in each 
of the N  equally spaced time intervals. They show that the best strategies are often linear 
combinations of a „naïve‟ strategy, of breaking the total size X  into T  identical 
packages of size TX / , and a correction portion reflecting the new information. In the 
absence of private stock-specific information, although the naïve strategy is not optimal 
in general, it is the best under the assumption that the price follows an arithmetic random 
walk and the impact of the liquidation strategy is linear. The authors consider alternative 
formulations of the price process and solve for optimal execution strategies for portfolios 
of correlated assets. They also illustrate the difficulties of imposing constraints on the 
optimization parameters. 
 Holthausen et al. (1987 and 1990) first introduced the intra-period distinction 
between temporary and permanent impacts. They estimated the impact of large block 
trades on NYSE on the stock prices. They broke each large block transaction, whether 
 68  
 
seller- or buyer-initiated, into two estimable variables.  The temporary price effect was 
defined as the continuously compounded return earned on the difference of the block 
transaction price and the equilibrium price prior to the block transaction. The permanent 
price effect was defined as the return on the difference between the equilibrium prices 
after and before the block transaction. For a seller-initiated block, these are depicted in 
Figure 1 (see Holthausen et al., 1987, Fig. 1). 
 In Almgren and Chriss (2000), who follow the same set-up, the stock price is 
subject to both effects in each of the N  equally spaced intervals Nktt kk ,,1),,( 1  , of 
length kNTtt kk   ,/1 . A trader faces selling X  shares over the fixed total time 
T  through a sequence of sales in each of the N  intervals. His holdings at the end points 
of the intervals are 0 ,x X  1 2 1, , , ,Nx x x   0Nx  , his sales during the intervals are 
1 , 1, ,k kx x k N  , and the speed with which he sells in each interval is denoted by 
1( ) /k k kv x x   . The equilibrium price follows an arithmetic random walk with no 
drift, but is subject to a permanent impact effect resulting from the trader‟s action. The 
equation of motion for the equilibrium price is: 
)(
~
1 kkkk vgzSS           (1) 
 
where )( kvg  represents the permanent impact function,   is the annualized normal 
volatility of the stock price, and kz
~
  is a standard normal deviate, with 
kkzzE kk 



  ,0
~~
. Note that )( kvg  is pre-multiplied by  to emphasize that the 
total permanent impact effect depends more on the total number of shares, kv , sold in 
each interval, than on the pure intensity parameter kv . The trading price, kS
~
, the trader 
faces in each interval is subject to a temporary impact function )( kvh : 
 
)(1
~
kkk vhSS            (2) 
 
Instead of simply minimizing the expected cost, the trader cares about the risk of the 
strategy (variance of the liquidation cost). He minimizes the negative utility associated 
with the cost of the protracted liquidation over the time interval ),,0( T . That cost, C , 
is defined as the difference between an instantaneous sale of all of his X  units at the 
time-zero price 0S  and the sum of the proceeds from a sequence of sales of 1( )k kx x  , 
each at the trading price kS
~
, over the entire time interval (0, )T , i.e. 
~
0 11
( )
N
kk kk
C XS x x S   . The cost is subject to the sequence of the random shocks 
kz
~
 .  Since the shocks are independent, the mean and the variance of the cost 
function can be derived as functions of the strategy sequence. The impact functions are 
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assumed to be linear in the sales intensity parameter kv , and parameterized as 
kk vvg )(  and kkk vnvh   )sgn()( . Hence, )( kvh  is denominated in $/share,   can 
be thought of as half the bid-ask spread denominated in $/share, and   has a peculiar 
denomination of [$/share]/[share/time]. Almgren and Chriss (2000) define a mean-
variance efficient frontier for a trader who minimizes the expected cost given a level of 
variance. This is equivalent to an unconstrained minimization of 
 
 αV[C]E[C]
Nkxk


min
},,1:{ 
        (3) 
 
where the Lagrange multiplier   can be interpreted as the relative risk aversion 
coefficient. When 0 , a unique solution *}{ kx  is guaranteed by the strict concavity of 
the minimand. For a risk-neutral trader ( 0 ), the optimal trajectory is a straight line of 
declining holdings over time defined by the decrement NXnk / . Risk averse traders 
follow convex lines below that line; risk loving traders follow concave lines above the 
straight line. Risk averse traders sell relatively more up front, and less later. They incur 
higher impact costs in order to avoid the exposure to the random shocks.  
 The two papers differ in their choices of the optimized functions. In Bertsimas 
and Lo (1998), the agent is an expected cost minimizer. The expected cost depends on the 
variance of the price process, but the agent does not care about the variance of the cost 
itself. The optimal control methodology allows for the agent to change his strategy during 
the execution of the program. Almgren and Chriss (2000) explicitly make their agent 
worry about risk by choosing only those solutions which lie on the mean-variance 
efficient frontier. Equivalently, they adopt a constant relative risk aversion utility 
function. If the latter is of a particular form (e.g. log-utility), the static up-front 
optimization yields the same solution as the less restrictive dynamic program. The 
authors discuss the use of VaR utility which does not guarantee that. It does avoid, 
however, their somewhat counterintuitive result whereby large and small baskets are 
liquidated identically by a trader with a given risk aversion coefficient. It also produces 
solutions closer to the straight line. In our optimization, we adopt VaR as the objective 
function
1
 even though the analysis does not depend on this assumption. This allows us to 
relate risk to return in a straightforward, intuitively parameterized, formulation. Dubil 
(2002) argues that this is the best choice for concentrated wealth liquidations in a non-
general-equilibrium setting.  He shows that it is equivalent to a mean-standard-deviation 
„efficient frontier‟ selection.  
 In order for a liquidity model to be of practical use, the market impact parameters  
have to be computed. The liquidity effects of this paper can be readily estimated by 
adapting the methodology of Glosten and Harris (1988) who consider two components of 
the bid-ask spread of NYSE stocks. The transitory component allows market-makers to 
cover inventory costs, clearing fees and monopoly profits and explains the negative serial 
correlation of closing prices. The persistent component due to adverse selection costs 
allows market-makers to recover from liquidity traders losses on trades with informed 
                                                          
1
 Basak and Shapiro (2001) examine some unappealing outcomes when the VaR-derived utility function is 
used in a continuous-time partial equilibrium. 
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traders. This information asymmetry component does not contribute to the 
serial correlation and is thus separable form the first. The paper relates the adverse 
selection cost to order size and applies a likelihood method to estimate and decompose 
the spread from time-series prices into the inventory and asymmetric information parts. 
Data requirements are quite modest and the specification is extendible to other markets of 
interest (VC stakes, private placements, high yield, etc.). We refer the reader to O‟Hara 
(1997) for a more extensive list of references. 
 
II. The Optimal Liquidation Horizon Model 
 In the reviewed studies of Section I, the agents face an externally imposed final 
liquidation time and solve for the optimal sales trajectory between time zero and that final 
time. The problems are therefore posed from a perspective of a proprietary trader who 
must liquidate by the end of a certain time interval (say, by the end of the day). In our 
model, the venture capital or high-yield investor does not face an exogenous final sale 
time. As our agent‟s problem is more general and a lot more difficult – to choose the best 
time and the best strategy – we choose to make a more-fitting simplifying assumption. He 
solves for the optimal final horizon by adopting a simple strategy to liquidate at a 
constant rate per unit of time. His strategy trajectory (a plot of his remaining position 
against time) is a straight line. We solve for the final time point where the line crosses the 
horizontal axis. This is equivalent to solving for the one constant rate of his sales 
expressed in units sold per time. His behavior is motivated by the fact that he has no 
special information about the timing or the „lumpiness‟ of other trades coming to the 
market beyond knowing the market impact of his own actions. He chooses the simplest 
strategy to sell the same amount in each time interval, but is concerned about the total 
time of liquidation.  
 We also do not follow the set-up of an agent optimally liquidating X  number of 
shares under the assumption that the equilibrium stock price is locally an arithmetic 
Brownian motion with no drift
2
. Instead, we consider an agent optimally reducing, 
instead of the number of shares, his dollar exposure to the return on a stock under the 
more palatable assumption that the return, not the price, follows a locally arithmetic 
Brownian motion. The mathematics are essentially the same, but the parameter 
interpretations are slightly different. Note that the main difference is the stochastic 
process assumption (log-normal price) and the form of the impact functions (cost defined 
as a known function of returns instead of the price).  
 Within the model, we consider two different forms of the market impact 
formulations: a general power function, which is uncorrelated with the price process, with 
some of its special cases (e.g. linear, square root), and a stochastic linear impact function 
correlated with the price process. The latter case allows for a feedback loop, whereby a 
significant drop in returns (prices) can cause a deterioration of liquidity. The agent‟s 
objective is to choose optimally the final time by which his holdings will be reduced to 
zero under the assumption that he sells at a constant speed over that horizon. His sales 
cause a permanent market return change at the “end” of each interval ),( tdtt  . They 
also cause a temporary shock to the realized return which deviates from the general 
market return, during the interval ),( tdtt  , but dissipates completely by the “end” of 
                                                          
2
 The equilibrium price has no drift except that due the permanent impact of the agent‟s sales.  
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that interval. We work in continuous time, but it is easy to show that the results 
are a natural limit of the discrete version in which the number of trading intervals within 
the fixed final horizon increases to infinity
3
. 
 Let tW  be the dollar amount of investment in the underlying asset (VC stake, 
listed stock or high-yield bond) at time t . The initial exposure to the asset return is 
denoted by 0W , and the final exposure is zero, i.e. 0TW . Let us define the agent‟s 
holdings at time t , as the ratio of his remaining dollar exposure to the original 
investment, i.e. let 
0W
W
x tt  . The agent starts with holdings 10  Xx  at time 0t  and 
liquidates all of them by the final time T , i.e. 0Tx . In each interval ),( tdtt  , the 
agent sells 
0
lim( )t t dt t
dt
dx x x

    of his holdings. The speed of trading in each interval is 
defined as tt
dx
v
dt
  . The equilibrium return on the underlying asset tR , representing all 
public information in the market, follows an arithmetic Brownian motion process
4
. The 
only drift is due to the accumulated permanent impact on the price from the sales 
executed by our agent. The equilibrium return, tR , at time ],0[ Tt   can thus be written: 
 
dsvgzR
t
stt )(
0         (4) 
 
where )( tvg  represents the permanent impact of the agent‟s sales on the equilibrium 
return, and tz  is the standard Wiener process. The cumulative trading return, tR
~
, realized 
by the agent through a trade within each interval ),( tdtt  5, is also subject to the 
temporary impact )( tvh  as a function of the speed of sales within the interval: 
 
)(
~
ttt vhRR           (5) 
 
Let us further assume that the agent sells at a constant speed vvt  , so that 
 
tdx v dt            (6) 
 
                                                          
3
 In continuous time, it is less intuitive to imagine the temporary impact dissipating by the end of an 
infinitesimal interval while the permanent impact persists. 
4
 The cumulative return, tR , is computed over the entire interval ),0( t . In discrete time, the cumulative 
return through period k , would be equivalently defined by   
k
i ik
rR
1
)1(1 , where ir  is the 
return on the asset in period i . 
5
 Note that both tR  and tR
~
 are random. The tilde symbol merely distinguishes the „intra-period‟ return 
realized by our agent from the equilibrium return in the market. 
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The excess profit (most likely negative, i.e. a cost) due to the non-
instantaneous liquidation, as a fraction of his original wealth, is defined as: 
 
 
T
t
T
tt vdtRdxR
0
~
0
~
)(         (7) 
 
 In order to introduce risk into the agent‟s decision process, we adopt a concave 
utility function. We choose the mean-standard deviation VaR framework. The VaR of a 
set of positions is defined as a profit value, * , for which the probability of the profit, 
 , falling below that critical value, * , is equal to a given quantity. The latter is equal 
to one minus the chosen confidence interval. For a normally distributed profit function, 
the VaR, * , is defined explicitly as: 
 
][][*  VE          (8) 
 
where   is a known number from the standard normal table corresponding to the chosen 
confidence level, e.g. 1.645 for a 5% left-tail probability. ][E  and ][V  denote the 
expected value and the variance of the profit. The confidence level-related parameter   
embodies an implicit set of risk preferences of the agent. His objective is to choose an 
optimal final liquidation time to maximize the VaR of his profit: 
 
}][][{max*max  VE
TT
       (9) 
 
Eq.       (9) is analogous to Eq.         (3) as 
C , with a change to the square root term in the variance, and is equivalent to the 
minimization of the VaR of the agent‟s excess cost due to the non-instantaneous 
liquidation. Dubil (2002) argues the appropriateness of using VaR in liquidity-
constrained wealth liquidation cases, e.g. for venture capitalists and executives with 
vested stock holdings. The interpretation of the agent‟s „utility‟ function is 
straightforward and appealing. He maximizes the expected profit of the liquidation (sale 
revenue net of the market impact), but assigns a penalty function to the risk defined as the 
standard deviation of the profit. The penalty parameter,  , depends directly on his 
„worry‟ level. An institutional argument in favor of choosing Eq.       (9) as 
the specification is that the optimand in Eq.         (8) is often 
viewed as a cost determinant rather than a risk measure. Bank and asset management 
firms multiply the dollar VaR by their borrowing rate as the amount of capital they 
“carry” to cover potential cost of liquidation. This is the prescribed Bank for International 
Settlements definition of the market risk capital.  
 
III. A General Power Function Market Impact 
 Let us assume that the market impact functions are of the following general form: 
 
H
ttt
G
tt
vnvh
vvg




)sgn()(
)(
        (10) 
 73  
 
where G and H are given constants
6
. In a pure sale strategy, 1)sgn( tn  for all t . The 
trading return in the interval ),( tdtt   is equal to: 
dsvvzR
t
G
s
H
ttt  0
~
        (11) 
 
The last three terms in Eq.        (11) represent a total liquidity 
discount. Using the Def. (7), we can write the profit function for the agent liquidating at a 
constant speed, v , as
7
: 
 
21
2
11
0
TvTvvTdtzv GH
T
t
          (12) 
 
The expected value of the profit is equal to
8
: 
 
21
2
11][ TvTvvTE GH           (13) 
 
and the variance of the profit is equal to
9
: 
 
223
3
1][ vTV           (14) 
 
Since vTX  , the mean and the variance can be written as: 
 
22
3
1
11
2
11
][
][


TXV
TXTXXE GGHH

 
      (15) 
 
Now we can set up the agent‟s optimization problem as the trade-off between the total 
liquidity discount, affecting the mean of the profit, and the „market risk‟ of returns, 
represented in the total variance of the profit, multiplied by the penalty parameter α, 
representing the agent‟s risk tolerance: 
 
}{max 22
3
111
2
11  TXTXTXX GGHH
T
      (16) 
                                                          
6
 Almgren (2001) extends original linear temporary impact to power specifications. 
7
 Write dtdsvdtvdtvdtzv
T t
G
T
H
TT
t )(
0 0
1
0
1
00  
    and reduce to Eq.       
(12). 
8
 Use integration by parts to show that 0][]|[][
0
0
0
 
T
t
T
t
T
t tdzEtzEdtzE . 
9
 Show that  
T
t
T
t
T
t
T
tT
T
t
T
t
T
t dztTtdzdzTtdzTztdztzdtz
00000
0
0
)(| . Then 
show that 
3
3
1
0
2
0
2
0
222
00
)(])([])([])([][ TdttTdttTEdztTEdztTEdtzV
TTT
t
T
t
T
t   . 
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The first-order condition for this optimization is the following equation in T : 
 
 
0)1( 2
1
32
11
2
111 
 XTTXGTXH GGHH      (17) 
 
Note that 1X . It is carried here to emphasize that all the parameters in     
    (10) are relative and can be defined for the holdings of the firm or a 
market. In general, Equation     (17) has to be solved by numerical methods. 
However, we can obtain closed-form solutions for some special cases. 
 
A. Linear Market Impact Functions 
 First let 1G . The permanent impact function is linear in the speed of sales, i.e. 
( )t tg v v  and ( )
H
t th v v   . Eq.     (17) can be solved explicitly for T : 
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If we further assume that 1 HG , so that ( )t tg v v  and ( )t th v v   , then the 
explicit solution for the optimal liquidation time becomes: 
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 Let us consider a few numerical examples for the linear market impact 
1 HG . Let 001714.0,15.0,645.1   . This corresponds to a 95% confidence 
interval VaR utility, an annualized return volatility of 15%, and a temporary impact of 
17.14 bp when selling at a pace of full holdings over a year. The optimal liquidation time 
is equal to 0833.0T  or 1 month. If the annualized volatility is changed to 10% 
( 1.645,   0.10,   0.001714  ), the agent optimally sells over 40 days as the risk 
of staying in the market is reduced. Instead, if he wants the same profit threshold at a 
99% confidence interval, i.e. he becomes more “risk-averse” ( 2.33,   0.15,   
0.001714  ) he will reduce his liquidation time to about 24 days. 
 The solutions        (18)-      
 (19) do not depend on the permanent impact coefficient,  , as it affects the 
trading return only through the cumulative sales total and not the sale amount in each 
interval. They are also independent of the mean temporary impact,  , which is a constant 
subtraction from the return no matter what the speed of sales is. 
 
B. Other Special Cases 
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 Let us consider the square root case for the permanent impact with a 
general form of the temporary impact function. We let 
2
1G  and H be general. The 
impact functions are ( )t tg v v  and ( )
H
t th v v   , and the closed-form solution is 
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If the temporary impact is also of a square root form, 
2
1H , so that the impact functions 
are ( )t tg v v  and ( )t th v v   , then the closed-form solution is 
 


2
3
3

T          (21) 
 
The choice of the exponent in the power function is subject to empirical research. The 
exponent of less than one, the square root in particular, is quite intuitive, as it exhibits 
diminishing returns. As one increases the speed of liquidation, initially the market impact 
grows rapidly, but at high levels of sales, the growth in the market impact decreases. In 
the square root case the solution is linear in the temporary impact parameter   and is 
independent of the initial size of the holdings to be liquidated, X . 
 What stands out in (20) and          (21) is that 
the different components of the liquidity discount do not have the same effect on the 
solution. The higher the temporary impact parameter  , the longer the optimal final time. 
At a given speed, an increase in the temporary impact parameter reduces the agent's 
realized return for each sale. To compensate for that, the agent slows down his sales and 
extends his selling horizon. This can be seen in Eq.     (17) with G=H=½. The part 
of the agent‟s maximand related to the temporary impact is an increasing function of T. In 
contrast, the objective function is a decreasing function of the final time T. The 
permanent impact parameter   also reduces the realized return in each interval, but only 
via an expression related to the cumulative amount transacted. It thus acts like a 
deterministic time-proportional „drag‟ on the expected returns and profit, not unlike the 
market risk penalty function on the agent's total utility. Were this „drag‟ per unit of time 
to increase, the agent would speed up his sales to minimize its negative effect on total 
profit. In the linear case, this „drag‟ was simply proportional to the total amount for sale 
and independent of time. With G=1, it dropped out of the Eq.     (17). As such, it 
operated similarly to a constant bid-ask spread and did not affect the solution at all. 
 Let us now set 0 . As it is often difficult to distinguish between the 
information-driven equilibrium price movement and one‟s own permanent impact, it is 
convenient to assume no permanent impact to ease the estimation of the temporary 
effects due to one‟s inventory problems. We allow a general form of the temporary 
impact, i.e. ( ) 0tg v   and ( )
H
t th v v   , and still get a closed-form solution. 
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The solution         (22) is identical to that of the linear case. 
There the permanent impact affected the equilibrium return only through the sales total, 
and not in each interval. Here that reduction is zero. 
 
IV. Stochastic Market Impact Correlated With Returns 
 The specification in this section captures a systemic feedback loop where, as 
prices and realized returns in the market drop, liquidity deteriorates, leading to further 
temporary depression of the returns. An obvious example here is the bursting of the tech 
bubble in 2000. This can be accomplished by assuming 
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where 
~
tz  is another Wiener process correlated with that driving the returns in     
    (4), i.e. 
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and   and   are two constants. The trading return is a random variable dependent on the 
realizations of two Brownian motions: 
 
dsvvzzR
t
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The profit function can be written as
10
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To set up the optimization, we derive, using vTX  , the expected profit as 
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00     and reduce. 
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and the variance of the profit
11
 as 
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The agent maximizes the VaR of his profit: 
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He faces the following first-order condition: 
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Eq.  (30), equivalent to a 5-th degree polynomial in T , can be solved numerically. 
 
 Table I shows the results using the numerical values of the previous section, 
001714.0,15.0,645.1   . Recall that the optimal liquidation time without the 
correlated term was 0833.0T  which was equivalent to 1 month. Here 0  is 
equivalent to the non-stochastic linear case. One common feature of all the results is that, 
for all correlations levels, the optimal liquidation time attains a minimum at some level of 
 12 and increases rapidly as we move away from that level in either direction. That is, the 
larger the shocks in absolute value, the more the agent compensates for them by staying 
longer in the market. In the combinations 0,0    (and 0,0   ), the liquidity 
deteriorates when the returns in the markets drop. The agent‟s profit has high variability 
as the combined shocks to his trading returns are strengthened. It is optimal for him to 
extend the liquidation period in order to reduce the temporary impact on the realized 
return. When the „reinforcement‟ coefficient is low, 001.0 , and the correlation of the 
market impact with the return process is negative, 50.0 , the agent liquidates 
quickly within a little over a month, 08596.0* T . When the feedback loop is amplified, 
                                                          
11
 To derive the variance we need to evaluate the following expression: 
~ ~ ~
0 0 0 0 0 0
[ ] [ ] [ ]
T T T T T T
t w wt u uI E z dt z dt E z z dudw E z z dudw         . 
We can split the inside integral w.r.t. du  in two regions ),0( wu  and ),( Twu . Noting that 
],min[][
~
wuzzE wu   , the expression I  evaluates to: 
31
30 0 0
T w T T
w
I ududw wdudw T        . 
12
 That level depends on all the other parameters through the first-order condition     (17). In the 
example, it is slightly negative as can be seen from Table I. 
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as   increases to 0.050, the agent‟s profits suffer greater variability, 
( ) 0.0867Std    0.0264 . He compensates, by extending his sales over time to 
36772.0* T , in order to minimize the utility penalty for that. The profit VaR would 
have declined to 2063.0)( VaR 13, had he stayed at the no-longer-optimal 
08596.0T . Instead it drops only to 1474.0)( VaR  at the optimal 36772.0* T . 
 
V. Conclusion 
 This paper develops a model of the liquidation behavior of a venture capitalist or 
hedge fund manager holding a concentrated stake in an asset. At the optimum, the 
liquidator balances the desire to limit the risk of random market factors against the 
negative impact his sales have on the realized return. The position is large enough so that 
it is exposed not only to market, but also liquidity risks. The realizable value of the asset 
may be significantly smaller than that based on marked-to-market prices. We consider 
two impact function characterizations: power, uncorrelated with returns, and linear, 
correlated with returns. We obtain closed-form solutions for the first. We examine 
numerical solution to the second case which provides for a feedback loop between price 
dislocations and liquidity. The solutions illustrate the effect of the interaction of liquidity 
and market conditions on the liquidator‟s optimal strategy.   
                                                          
13
 Not shown in Table I. Plug in the original T=0.08596 to the VaR Equation     (16). 
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Table I. 
  Table I. Optimal Liquidation Times, the Expected Value, Variance and VaR of the Profit as Functions of  
   Θ  and ρ            
                              
       Optimal T       E[Π]     Std[Π]     VaR[Π]   
      Θ     ρ =-0.99 ρ =-0.5 ρ =0 ρ =0.5 ρ =0.99 ρ =-0.99 ρ =-0.5 ρ =0 ρ =-0.99 ρ =-0.5 ρ =0 ρ =-0.99 ρ =-0.5 ρ =0 
-0.050 0.33627 0.35359 0.36165 0.36772 0.37266 -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0047 0.0071 0.0501 0.0708 -0.0168 -0.0872 -0.1213 
-0.030 0.20380 0.22547 0.23520 0.24239 0.24818 -0.0084 -0.0076 -0.0073 0.0055 0.0390 0.0551 -0.0175 -0.0718 -0.0980 
-0.010 0.07462 0.10636 0.11805 0.12624 0.13260 -0.0230 -0.0161 -0.0145 0.0040 0.0247 0.0342 -0.0296 -0.0568 -0.0707 
-0.003 0.07093 0.08122 0.08783 0.09296 0.09714 -0.0242 -0.0211 -0.0195 0.0167 0.0223 0.0263 -0.0516 -0.0577 -0.0628 
-0.002 0.07486 0.08080 0.08541 0.08920 0.09246 -0.0229 -0.0212 -0.0201 0.0195 0.0229 0.0256 -0.0550 -0.0588 -0.0622 
-0.001 0.07902 0.08164 0.08390 0.08596 0.08782 -0.0217 -0.0210 -0.0204 0.0223 0.0238 0.0252 -0.0584 -0.0601 -0.0618 
0.000 0.08338 0.08338 0.08338 0.08338 0.08338 -0.0206 -0.0206 -0.0206 0.0250 0.0250 0.0250 -0.0617 -0.0617 -0.0617 
0.001 0.08782 0.08596 0.08390 0.08164 0.07902 -0.0195 -0.0199 -0.0204 0.0276 0.0264 0.0252 -0.0649 -0.0634 -0.0618 
0.002 0.09246 0.08920 0.08541 0.08080 0.07486 -0.0185 -0.0192 -0.0201 0.0301 0.0280 0.0256 -0.0680 -0.0653 -0.0622 
0.003 0.09714 0.09296 0.08783 0.08122 0.07093 -0.0176 -0.0184 -0.0195 0.0325 0.0297 0.0263 -0.0711 -0.0672 -0.0628 
0.010 0.13260 0.12624 0.11805 0.10636 0.07462 -0.0129 -0.0136 -0.0145 0.0473 0.0414 0.0342 -0.0907 -0.0816 -0.0707 
0.030 0.24818 0.24239 0.23520 0.22547 0.20380 -0.0069 -0.0071 -0.0073 0.0777 0.0675 0.0551 -0.1348 -0.1181 -0.0980 
0.050 0.37266 0.36772 0.36165 0.35359 0.33627 -0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0047 0.0999 0.0867 0.0708 -0.1689 -0.1474 -0.1213 
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Figure 1. Temporary and permanent price effects of a seller-initiated block. 
